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STEP UP TO THE SCALE: WAGES AND
UNIONS IN THE SPORTS INDUSTRY
DARRYL HALE, ESQ.*
The free enterprise system which developed in the United States has
long vaunted the concept called competition as the alleged key to pro-
gress and prosperity. However, as a result of an imbalance of informa-
tion and power, "competition" has become degraded by unfairness,
exploitation, and even monopoly. In response to these imbalances, Con-
gress has promulgated safeguards embodied in the Sherman Antitrust
Act and the National Labor Relations Act to preserve the virtues of
competition. One aspect of this unfairness and exploitation has been
demonstrated over the years through wage competition. This competi-
tion has been utilized in industries in order to divide individuals provid-
ing services, to depress wages, and to reduce opportunities.
The professional team sports industry is not exempt. The monetary
interests of a few highly paid, "big name" players have long been pitted,
by general managers and player personnel directors, against the more
modestly paid, lesser known players who make up the vast majority of
individuals seeking to perform in professional team sports. Ed Garvey,
former Executive Director of the NFL Players Association, vividly por-
trays this scenario in the following passage:
[T]he NFL has split the players into haves and have-nots. They
obfuscated the human issues by emphasizing the economic issues.
It was simply divide and conquer. The original message to the
linemen was: "Are you really on strike so quarterbacks can get
more money? I thought you were smarter than that, son. We
won't bid for you. We will bid for the quarterbacks, and when we
do, there won't be any money left in the pot for you. It's none of
my business because its [sic] your union, but if I were you, I'd get
my fanny into camp before that good-looking rookie beats you
out of your job."'
The divisiveness of wage competition has also been perpetuated by
the influence of agents who have concentrated their recruitment and
* B.S. 1983, Cornell University; J.D. 1986, Harvard University. Mr. Hale is a Field Attor-
ney for the National Labor Relations Board. The views expressed in this article are not repre-
sented to be the views of the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. Hale expresses sincere
appreciation to Tom Gibbons, Esq. for his useful comments and support.
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representational efforts upon the lottery picks, the first round draft
picks, and the "star" free-agents without consideration for the wage and
team performance concerns of their current or prospective client's pres-
ent or potential teammates. This article deals with bidding for the serv-
ices of athletes in professional team sports. More specifically, it
concentrates on the promotion of fair competitive bidding based upon
skills and performance through the elimination of wage competition and
replacement by the institution of league-wide wage scales negotiated by
players unions. In light of the vested interests of agents against the insti-
tution of a wage scale, its validity shall be established through an analysis
of current labor and antitrust laws. Further, although the professional
team sports industry has unique qualities distinguishing it from other un-
ionized industries, collectively bargained wage scales are not only viable,
but also an appropriate function of the duty of fair representation owed
by players unions or associations.
I. WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
A. Sports Bargaining
Sports leagues today collectively bargain with players unions about
fringe benefits and conditions of employment. Unlike most industries
with a unionized work force, sports leagues allow the individual player to
bargain for his own salary directly with management.2 This aspect of
bargaining makes sports league negotiation a bifurcated process
whereby the players association establishes minimum player contract
terms, and an agent representing the player deals with the financial is-
sues of salary, length of contract, bonuses and guarantees.3 Although
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act makes the players
union the exclusive bargaining representative of players, the failure of
players unions to pursue league-wide wage scales in bargaining with
management has caused them to waive their exclusivity and to allow
wages to be individually negotiated.4
The appropriateness of this system and the influence of agents has
been commented upon by Robert C. Berry and William B. Gould in the
following passage:
2. Phillip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a
Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REv. 341, 385 (1983).
3. Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of
Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 705-06 (1981).
4. Closius, supra note 2, at 385.
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The rationale for this bifurcation is largely historical and arguably
inappropriate today. Such bifurcation is, nevertheless, the pre-
vailing state of the art. Consequently, agents and attorneys play
an active, influential role in negotiations. The prominence of
these agents and attorneys... [makes them] a visible force with
whom [players unions, owners and players) must bargain.5
Further, this bifurcated system of negotiations creates a situation
where, despite collectively bargained minimum standards, players with,
and especially those without reputations, are vulnerable to the abuses of
agents who extract exorbitant fees that effectively reduce a player's re-
ceipt below the minimum rate. Agent fees derived as a percentage of a
player's gross salary rather than upon the amount of time spent in pro-
viding representation can serve to intensify wage competition among
players as union members through individual salary negotiation and
leave job hungry athletes prone to exploitation.6
Agents may argue that the market can take care of the problem of
exploitation that plagues individual salary negotiation. After all, the
market of available agents is extensive, and players should be able to
distinguish good agents from bad agents. Ultimately, the bad agents
would be driven out of the market by competition from the good agents.
In addition, agents may argue that the imposition of a league-wide wage
scale upon players would intrude upon the freedom of players and
agents to contract and participate in voluntary exchange.7 This freedom
advances individual autonomy and promotes the efficient operation of
labor markets through contracts that meet the unique needs of the par-
ticular parties.8 According to this line of argument, a wage scale would
be seen as a foreign element in the agent-athlete contractual relationship
imposed by a remote body which is not likely to have better information
about individual preferences than the contractual parties holding them.9
The market, however, fails to address the lack of financial and en-
trepreneurial information on the part of athletes, especially those at the
entry level in professional sports, seeking to overcome the intense com-
petition to obtain positions on professional team rosters. A wage scale
negotiated by players unions would not only obviate this lack of infor-
mation in salary negotiations, but also focus upon the problem alluded to
above regarding the imbalance in quality representation. Many athletes
5. Berry & Gould, supra note 3, at 706.
6. Id. at 802.
7. Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 947 (1984).
8. Id. at 951.
9. Id. at 954.
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lack the bargaining power that comes with collegiate notoriety, first
round draft pick or lottery status, and consequently do not attract "big
name" agents. Some athletes are not able to obtain an agent at all and
become vulnerable to the "take it or leave it" or "first and final offer"
player contracts rendered by team management.
In addition, the league-wide wage scale would be negotiated, not by a
remote public body, but by players union representatives elected by the
players themselves to determine wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment. These unions are experienced and knowledgea-
ble in the unique needs and concerns of professional athletes. Under
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, players unions, un-
like individual athletes, have a statutory right to obtain information from
league management necessary and relevant to protect the bargaining in-
terest of its members. Further, under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act, players unions, unlike agents, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative, would have a duty to fairly represent all of its
members, even in negotiations over player salaries.
On the other hand, under the current bifurcated system, an agent's
actions may have an impact on the client's athletic performance which is
greatly influenced by the athlete's financial position.'" For example,
rookies and veterans may get stuck in a long-term contract negotiated by
their agent that does not reflect proven performance or value to a
franchise's success. The contract may also reduce the athlete's attrac-
tiveness to another team uninterested in being shackled with a long-term
contract. This situation only fuels the motive for contract renegotiations,
competition to be the highest paid player at a position, and holdouts,
resulting in instability and lower athletic performance that definitely af-
fect the working conditions of other bargaining unit employees.
Similarly, agents who represent both rookies and veteran athletes can
play off the interests of the veteran client in favor of a more lucrative
rookie client. Further, the availability of quality entry level players has a
vital effect upon the contract dollar value and conditions obtained for
veteran players. For instance, in the NFL the price tag for every valua-
ble player is likely to be two draft choices." In light of the vital effect of
rookies (who are not in the bargaining unit until they sign with a team)
upon veterans bargaining unit players; league-wide wage scales covering
10. JOHN C. WEISTART & Cym H. LowELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS, § 3.17, at 319 (1979).
11. Lawrence Shulruff, The Football Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 48.
. [Vol. 5:123
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rookies and veterans would be a legitimate result of the union's duty to
provide fair representation to all of its members.1
2
B. Salary Proliferation and the Salary Cap
We have all heard of the exorbitant contracts given to the highly
touted, but unproven, inexperienced rookie who does not live up to ex-
pectations. We have also heard of the magnificent long-term guaranteed
contracts granted to notorious, free agent veterans acquired as the
"missing link" to a championship. However, with their salary guaran-
teed, the performance of some of these players happened to be missing.
Over the years, these contracts have caused average salaries to rise. For
example, the average salary in the NFL has risen about 272% from
$198,000 in 1986 to $737,000 in 1993; in the NBA, the average salary has
risen 252% from $395,000 in 1986 to $1,390,000 in 1993; the average sal-
ary in major league baseball has risen about 223% from $371,157 in 1985
to $1,200,000 in 1994.13
It must be noted that average salaries can be skewed by the relatively
few large salaries at the high end of the range and do not reflect the
distribution of compensation to the players union membership as a
whole. With the top 10% of players claiming 50% of the salary money, a
two-tiered salary system is created pitting players against players. 4 The
bifurcated system of salary negotiation has left players unions powerless
in combating this wage competition and has left them on the sidelines
in the contest with management to equitably distribute players'
compensation.
In addition, a lack of job security can be seen in professional sports
under the bifurcated salary negotiation system in that often an athlete's
most lucrative contract is his first contract. Players may not be around
for a second contract after falling victim to subjective judgments about
12. See Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 179-182 (1971) (the Supreme
Court held that a union can legitimately bargain for non-bargaining unit employees with inter-
ests that vitally affect bargaining unit employees).
13. Jarrett Bell, NFL Players: Salary Cap Not Perfect Fit, USA TODAY, July 13, 1994, at
1C; The High Price Of NFL Free Agency, USA TODAY, July 13, 1994, at 10C; PAUL D.
STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINIrNG 29, 100, tbls. 2.3 and 4.2
(1986); Richard Justice, Baseball Faces Strike, Again, WASH. PosT, June 12, 1994, at Al, A25.
In comparison, the percentage increase in minimum salaries has not been as dramatic. For
example, in the NFL, the minimum salary for rookies on a team's active roster has only risen
100% from $50,000 in 1986 to $100,000 in 1993. See 1982 NFL Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, Art. XXII, at 32; NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 1993-2000, Art. XXXVIII, at
116.
14. See The High Price Of NFL Free Agency, supra note 13, at lC.
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performance which leave the athletes unemployed. As a consequence of
salary caps proposed by management in recent years, some of these
judgments have begun to be made based upon money, as well as age,
injuries and skill.15
In 1983 with losses averaging $700,000 per club in the NBA, the own-
ers went on the offense and demanded a salary cap on each team. The
players union resisted a cap and demanded a share in the percentage of
future cable television revenues and guarantees on all contracts.' 6 The
union failed to demand a league-wide wage scale, but under the threat of
a strike, the owners on March 31, 1983, agreed to give the players a 53%
guarantee of the league's gross revenues. However, the players capitu-
lated to the owners in their demand for a salary cap and have performed
under a provision for a cap on team salaries for over 11 years.17
Similarly, ten years later, the NFL Players Association agreed with
the owners to a cap on team salaries in exchange for a guaranteed per-
centage of league revenues.' 8 By not demanding or securing a league-
wide salary scale by position, the union gave up an opportunity to help in
the equitable distribution of this guaranteed compensation. Presently,
the baseball owners are seeking a salary cap similar to that imposed in
the NFL and NBA, and labor strife and instability threaten to disrupt an
exciting baseball season.' 9
II. STEP Up To T=E SCALE AND Do YOUR DUTY
A. Labor Exemption
Over the years, unions have tried to reduce competition among their
members and, in the process, raise standards and benefits for all of their
members. This is in obvious conflict with the founding principle of the
United States economy, competition, a notion which has been protected
through legislation. As a result, the announced public policy of favoring
collective employee action in order to balance employer power and to
prevent employee exploitation must be balanced against the antitrust
policy of prohibiting restraints upon competition.
15. Bell, supra note 13, at 2C.
16. STAUDOHAR, supra note 13, at 109.
17. Id. at 111.
18. See NFL COLLECIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000, art. XXIV, at 77-78.
19. See Justice, supra note 13. In fact, at the time this article went to print, the 1994
baseball season was disrupted by a season ending strike that began in mid-August.
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Accommodating antitrust policy and labor policy takes effort. Doug-
las L. Leslie, however, has described the proper balance between labor
and antitrust statutes:
Because the labor statutes do not regulate union restraints on
commercial competition, subjecting such restraints to antitrust lia-
bility does not interfere with national labor policy. However, us-
ing the antitrust statutes to limit union restraints on the labor
market on the ground that those restraints affect the efficient
functioning of business markets does interfere with national labor
policy. Such limitations on union power are properly found, if
they are found at all, in the labor statutes.20
Noticing this balance, the Supreme Court has recognized a labor ex-
emption from antitrust laws since 1941. In order to redress a labor-man-
agement bargaining imbalance, the labor exemption was created by
construing the Clayton and the Norris-LaGuardia Acts.21 The relevant
antitrust law with which this exemption for labor organizations deals is
section 1 of the Sherman Act which prohibits every contract or combina-
tion in the form of a trust or otherwise or conspiracy which restrains
trade or commerce among the several states.22 Section 6 of the Clayton
Act, however, declares that human labor is not a commodity or article of
commerce and immunizes from antitrust liability labor organizations and
their members lawfully carrying out their legitimate objectives.z3 Fur-
ther, section 20 of the Clayton Act protects acts taken in the self-interest
of employees and that occur in the course of disputes concerning terms
or conditions of employment.24 Thus, a players union may place re-
straints upon its members to eliminate wage competition and to prevent
exploitation.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act emphasizes that union regulations im-
posed upon its members are only protected if they occur in the context
of a labor dispute or any controversy concerning the terms or conditions
of employment.' With this stipulation, the statutory labor exemption
created by the Supreme Court does not apply if an agreement is made
between a union and any non-labor group or persons who are not parties
20. Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1197 (1980).
21. Case Note, Labor Exemption to Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provi-
sion Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest- McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21
B.C. L. REv. 680 (1980).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
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to a labor dispute.26 Consequently, in determining whether the statutory
exemption applies, a court must consider whether a labor group is being
unilaterally restrained by the union. A group is classified as a labor
group if the group restrained takes actions that affect a job or wage com-
petition or that have some other economic interrelationship that affect
legitimate union interests.27
Under the analysis developed above, player agents are a labor group
in the sports industry. A union's exercise of its ability to negotiate
player salaries would fall within the labor exemption since it may be ar-
gued that this step is necessary to assure that players receive quality rep-
resentation and fair, stable salaries. Since agents hold a powerful
position in the current bifurcated sports bargaining process and could
undermine the unions' wage scales through fees charged to clients, the
institution of a league-wide wage scale negotiated by the union would
"embody... a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten
the maintenance of the basic wage structure .... ."I Thus, the prolifera-
tion of wage competition by agents versus a players union effort to estab-
lish a wage scale would be considered a labor dispute2 9 between player
agents and the union. Accordingly, a league-wide wage scale established
by the union covering maximum and minimum player salaries by posi-
tion would be exempted from an antitrust challenge brought by player
agents.
As conveyed above, unilateral actions by a union to eliminate wage
competition perpetuated by player agents would be protected from anti-
trust liability by the statutory labor exemption. However, if the union
includes these actions as part of a collective-bargaining agreement with a
non-labor group such as the sports league, the statutory labor exemption
would not apply. On the other hand, this collective-bargaining agree-
ment would be protected by a nonstatutory labor exemption if the agree-
ment is intimately related to the union's vital concerns of wages, hours
and working conditions.3 0 This need to protect collectively bargained
26. H.A. Artists & Associates. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704,712 (1981); see also
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
27. H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 712; see also Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99,
106 (1968).
28. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959).
29. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1988), a labor dispute covers a
"controversy... concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
(Emphasis added).
30. Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
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agreements is commented upon by the Supreme Court in the following
passage:
[A] proper accommodation between the congressional policy
favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congres-
sional policy favoring free competition in business markets re-
quires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a
limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor
policy of favoring the association of employees to eliminate com-
petition over wages and working conditions. Union success in or-
ganizing workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect
price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor
law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition
were held a violation of the antitrust laws."
This nonstatutory labor exemption not only protects the union en-
gaged in the agreement, but also the employer acting in accordance with
the agreement. Accordingly, team management may be exempt from an-
titrust challenges if it refuses to deal with agents to negotiate individual
player salaries. However, this exemption for employers or non-labor
groups is only valid if the agreement meets the following three-prong
test:
1. the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship;
2. the restraint concerns a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining; and
3. the restraint is a product of an arms-length negotiation, and it
furthers the policy favoring collective bargaining to the degree
necessary to override the antitrust laws.32
In considering the existence of a bona-fide arm's-length negotiation,
the courts typically have required something more than just bargaining. 33
The exemption usually is granted if the bargaining produces contract
provisions which were initiated by and advanced by a union pursuing the
heart of its members' interests.3 4 Thus, the collectively bargained re-
straint will not protect an employer group from antitrust challenges if
31. Id. (citations omitted); see also H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 716 n. 19.
32. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see also McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193,1197-98
(6th Cir. 1979), rev'g 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S.
676, 689-90 (1965).
33. Karen A. Marencik, Comment, The National Football League Eligibility Rule and An-
titrust Law: Illegal Procedure, 19 VAL. U. L. REv. 729, 749 (1985).
34. Closius, supra note 2, at 358.
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the restraint is not in the union's self-interest and is initiated and ad-
vanced by the employer group.35 Accordingly, if a bargaining impasse
has occurred, an employer's unilateral implementation of a restraint,
close to that acceptable to the union but specifically rejected when other
benefits were not included, would not receive the nonstatutory exemp-
tion from antitrust challenges.36
On the whole, a league-wide wage scale collectively bargained by a
players union depends upon protection from antitrust liability. Effective
maintenance of the salary scale dictates that club management refuse to
negotiate individual salary contracts with agents. Since the entire league
would uphold the salary scale, agents can not easily avoid it. Also, under
the collective agreement, the union can enforce its scale by filing griev-
ances against a club that negotiates individual salary contracts with
agents. Support for a collectively bargained wage scale initiated and ad-
vanced by players unions is enhanced by the importance of the role of
labor law in settling labor disputes, which is conveyed in the following
passage:
Mature labor-management relations should be primarily gov-
erned by federal labor law. Collective negotiations, unfair labor
practice hearings and arbitration proceedings - the traditional in-
cidents of labor law - will therefore replace the court system as
the primary focus for future disputes between [the sports leagues,
players, union and agents].
... Disputes between labor entities - players, agents or unions
- should be characterized as a labor dispute. Antitrust concepts
therefore should have no role in the resolution of such
disagreements. 37
The application of the labor exemption to the sports bargaining con-
text is based on the holdings found in H.A. Artists & Associates v. Ac-
tors' Equity Association3 a 1981 United States Supreme Court decision.
In this case, Actors' Equity Association (Equity), a union which repre-
sents most of the stage actors and actresses in the United States, had
entered into collective-bargaining agreements with virtually all major
theatrical producers, fixing minimum wages and other conditions of em-
ployment for Equity's members. As a result of abuses on the part of
theatrical agents who negotiated employment contracts for actors and
35. Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C. 1976).
36. Michael S. Hobel, Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 201 (1982).
37. Closius, supra note 2, at 399-400.
38. 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
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actresses with producers, the union unilaterally established a licensing
system for the regulation of agents. The license regulations included a
limitation on commissions charged, the avoidance of conflict of interests,
and the preservation of the actor's ability to terminate the agency
relationship.3 9
This system was particularly needed in light of the extraction of high
commissions which tended to undermine collectively bargained rates of
compensation. Since the system was not negotiated as part of any collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, the union prohibited its members, instead of
the producers, from dealing with agents who had not obtained a license
from the union.4°
In response to this regulation, agents who refused to obtain union
licenses filed suit contending that the union's regulations violated sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, holding that the union's licensing system was protected from
antitrust liability by the statutory exemption. The court of appeals af-
firmed the decision. The Supreme Court also affirmed the decision;
however, it held that the fees the union charged the agents to obtain the
license must be justified as necessary to promote the union's legitimate
self-interest in order to avoid antitrust liability.4'
This opinion is important because it designated the theatrical agents
as a labor group in dispute with the actors' union. The designation is
motivated by the special structure of the theater industry which makes it
"customary if not essential for union members to secure employment
through agents" whose fees are calculated as a percentage of the mem-
ber's wage.42 Similarly, the labor group designation can be applied to
sports agents who benefit from the bifurcated negotiation process in
sports leagues. This process also makes it customary, if not prudential,
for athletes to obtain playing contracts through the use of agents. Thus,
the union's legitimate concern for the elimination of wage competition
and for the maintenance of union wage standards serves as a foundation
to support the shelter of wage scales from an antitrust challenge by
agents.
39. Closius, supra note 2, at 392-393.
40. H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 707.
41. Id. at 722-23.
42. Id. at 720.
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B. Let's Be Fair About This
With the elimination of the bifurcated system of bargaining, athletes
would continue to be able to obtain agents to help them assess educa-
tional and job options, market their status as sports figures, prepare
them for retirement, and invest their money. It must be made clear that
the wage scale would not be instituted simply to "rob" agents of the
handsome fees derived through individual salary negotiation, nor to nec-
essarily restrain individual players from making as much money as they
can. Conversely, the league-wide wage scale would be instituted as a
"team approach" to maximizing wages, benefits and job security for all
union members in the professional team sports industry. Since league
games cannot be played without the players, the solidarity of star players
with their actual or potential teammates enhances bargaining power and
union leverage on group issues such as pensions and disability insurance.
In addition, union security provisions of collective agreements man-
date that players pay initiation fees, union dues or agency fees. In fact,
under the 1993 collective-bargaining agreement between the NFL and
the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), each player is responsible for
$5000 in annual dues.43 Thus, players are paying for their union repre-
sentation and are entitled to expect quality representation. In this light,
in December 1993, twenty-six members of the Washington Redskins re-
fused to pay dues, and the NFLPA demanded their suspension. A suit
challenging the suspension was subsequently pursued by the players.
Tight end Terry Orr led the court battle stating that the suit was brought
in part as "a means of players expressing an unwillingness to financially
support a union they felt didn't best serve their needs.""
Moreover, adequate and fair representation is a duty imposed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in a series of labor law decisions upon the union
designated under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act as
the exclusive bargaining representative of bargaining unit employees. In
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,45 the Court likened the
authority of the exclusive bargaining representative to that of a legisla-
tive body which could restrict the rights of those it represents, but which
43. See David Elfin, Orr, Ex-teammates Win Another Round in Union Dues Suit, WASH.
TIMES, June 9, 1994, at B3; see also NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEmrNT 1993-2000,
Art. V, §§ 1 and 2, at 11.
44. Bell, supra note 13, at 2C. The players contend in the suit that they were not required
to pay the dues since they worked in Virginia, a right-to-work state. Id.
45. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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also had a duty to carry out its representation fairly and without hostile
discrimination.46
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,47 the Court realized that the repre-
sentative is entitled to discretion as to how it should best serve its mem-
bers. The Court held that "[a] wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it repre-
sents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion."' 8 While the two previous cases dealt with
the union's duty in contract negotiation, the Court's decision in Vaca v.
Sipes49 addresses the union's duty in administering a contract, mainly
concerning the processing of grievances under the contract. The union's
motive behind its decisions regarding the grievance must not be hostility
or bad faith, and its conduct must not be arbitrary, invidious, capricious
or perfunctory.50
Although the players union has a wide range of discretion in negoti-
ating on behalf of its members, "[t]he test of its duty of fair representa-
tion is how well all players do under an agreement, not just whether a
few at the top of the salary range do well. ' 51 Thus, boasting that the
average salary of players has risen may not represent an adequate repre-
sentation of the membership if the average is raised by the increasing
salaries of a few "young" free agents or of athletes in "glamour" posi-
tions such as that of a quarterback.
Along this line of argument, the push for free agency, without the
elimination of bifurcated salary negotiation, and the institution of a sal-
ary cap in the NFL has resulted in the elimination of employment oppor-
tunities for proven veterans who were participants in the 1994 Pro
Bowl.5' Further, other experienced veterans have had to accept reduc-
tions in pay despite stellar performance.53 The negotiation of a league-
wide wage scale by position would give the union control over wage
competition and enhance its representation of its members in areas such
as job security, maximization of pension, severance, and disability bene-
46. Martin Wagner, Have the Courts Extended a Sound Doctrine Too Far?, 33 LAB. L.J.
487, 488 (1982).
47. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
48. Id. at 338.
49. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
50. Wagner, supra note 46, at 489-491.
51. Garvey, supra note 1, at 335 (citing R. GORMAN, BASIC TEX ON LABOR LAW 381,
695-98 (1976)).
52. See Bell, supra note 13, at 2C.
53. See The High Price Of NFL Free Agency, supra note 13, at 11C; see also Jarrett Bell,
Union Boss Says Free Agency, Cap Doing Their Jobs, USA TODAY, June 6, 1994, at 13C.
1994]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
fits. With the elimination of exorbitant contracts for rookies or other
young prospects with "potential," more money would be available to
compensate veterans who have successfully endured the rigors of profes-
sional team sports and continue to perform at an acceptable level. In the
absence of the league-wide wage scale, these union goals that benefit the
majority, if not all of the membership, can be undermined through indi-
vidual salary negotiation and the increased use of deferred
compensation. 4
Further, a league-wide wage scale by position serves the union's in-
terest in more stable player contracts. This stability alleviates perhaps
the greatest problem for players unions - constantly shifting membership
due to the professional athlete's relatively short career span 5 The aver-
age professional career for athletes in the NFL and NBA is about four
years, about five years in the NHL, and only slightly longer in major
league baseball. 6 In addition, many professional athletes in team sports
have little to no job security due to the fact that they can be "cut" at any
time or to the fact that player movement restrictions and salary prolifer-
ation for entry level players have actually depressed available
opportunities. 7
In addition, the idea of instituting a wage scale by position for profes-
sional employees with unique or specialized skills in order to eliminate
wage competition and to maximize productivity/teamwork is not novel.
The concept is used for government attorneys and for physicians em-
ployed by hospitals. In each of these industries, teamwork is vital to the
service rendered and overrides the interest of the individual to "maxi-
mize" his salary. Similarly, professional athletes in team sports are not
individual entertainers who put on their own show. Every star
quarterback needs blockers, running backs and receivers. Every star
center needs a point guard, and every star pitcher needs a catcher, in-
fielders and outfielders.
In sum, the performance is rendered as a team, and accordingly the
benefits derived should be distributed to the team. As the exclusive bar-
gaining representative, the union is in the unique position of being able
to negotiate these benefits based upon information on the contributions
by a player's position, level of skill and experience. The league-wide
wage scale would be formulated based upon this information. Further,
54. Berry & Gould, supra note 3, at 801-02.
55. Id. at 708-709.
56. STAUDOHAR, supra note 13, at 147.
57. See Garvey, supra note 1, at 338.
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the scale at each position should also reflect a range or steps within a
salary level to compensate "starting" players at a greater level than re-
serve players that have the same level of years in the league. The scale
should also encompass a cost of living factor to compensate for the vary-
ing costs in the cities bearing franchises. Further, in order to provide
incentive for performance and to award productivity, a fund for per-
formance bonuses should be negotiated based upon objective criteria.
This fund would be tied to a percentage of league revenues.
A league-wide wage scale is not only an appropriate function of the
union's duty of fair representation, but also has been advocated by the
NFLPA in the past. In 1982, after initially seeking 55% of the NFL's
revenues to be distributed in a fund for salaries and pensions, the players
modified their demand and sought a wage scale that would base com-
pensation on seniority and objective merit criteria .5  During negotia-
tions for the 1982 agreement, the union informed the NFL that it
rejected the bifurcated salary negotiation system in favor of the system
prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act.5 9 The NFL's manage-
ment committee resisted this demand because its "right of first refusal"
restrictions on player movement incorporated individual salary negotia-
tions under the bifurcated system.60
Recognizing that the purpose of collective-bargaining is to supersede
the terms of separate agreements with individual employees in favor of
terms that reflect the interests of the group, the NFLPA filed a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the NFL refused
to bargain with the player's exclusive bargaining representative over
wages, a mandatory subject of bargaining.6' The Board found merit in
the charge and included the allegations in a consolidated complaint
against the NFL on October 29, 1982. The Board, however, failed to set
a hearing date.62 Unfortunately, the Board did not get to rule on the
issue since the charge was withdrawn under the terms of the 1982 collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that authorized individual player-team salary
negotiations.63
58. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 13, at 71-72; see also Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor
Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duna LJ. 339, 366.
59. Lock, supra note 58, at 366.
60. Id.
61. See id. (citing J.L Case Co. v. NLRB, 312 U.S. 332,338 (1944); NLRB Case No. 2-CA-
19104-2).
62. See Lock, supra note 58, at 366-367 (citing Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated
Complaint and Notice of Hearing, NLRB Cases Nos. 2-CA-18923, 2-CA-18995, 2-CA-19104,
2-CA-19104-2 (Oct. 29, 1982)).
63. Lock, supra note 58, at 367.
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III. CONCLUSION: STEP ON THE SCALE
This article advocates the negotiation of a league-wide wage scale for
professional team sports. This endeavor would greatly help sports un-
ions in their duty to fairly represent their members and increase bargain-
ing power for issues dear to the group membership, such as pensions,
severance pay, injury benefits and job security. Moreover, the scale
would eliminate wage competition and enhance quality representation
for all union members. The unions, unlike agents, have a statutory duty
to fairly represent all players in the bargaining unit.
Although this article has not focused upon the related issue of free
agency, it may be argued by agents that the issue of free agency would be
moot if individual salary negotiations were eliminated. However, this
argument assumes that the desire for free agency only involves the max-
imization of an individual's salary. On the contrary, players seek to
move to other teams to play in their hometown city; to find the right mix
of their talent and experience with teammates and team style, philoso-
phy or orientation; to obtain the chance to "start;" and to play for a
contender for the championship. Further, the league-wide wage scale
should actually enhance player movement as it would allow management
to know its labor costs and to open opportunities for free agents that
would help produce a winner. Also, management would not be bur-
dened by long-term, guaranteed contracts laden with deferred compen-
sation, or by haggling agents unconcerned with team goals, but focused
upon making their client the highest paid player at his position.
Further, the sports world has recently seen that the labor law princi-
ples of collective bargaining, arbitration, and grievance processing is the
preferred method to resolve labor disputes in professional team sports,
especially in light of the short careers of players and the longevity of the
legal process under antitrust litigation.64 For instance, in 1993, the
NFLPA recertified itself and negotiated a seven-year collective bargain-
ing agreement in resolution of a long antitrust legal battle over free
agency. On July 18, 1994, a federal judge denied an antitiist challenge
by the NBA Players Association against the NBA salary cap leaving
them to settle their differences with the NBA at the bargaining table.65
64. In light of relatively short careers of players and the low level of job security in profes-
sional team sports, the increased use of section 100) injunctions under the National Labor
Relations Act pending resolution of a Labor Board Complaint would enhance the usefulness
of the Labor Board in redressing unfair labor practices committed in the administration of the
wage scale. See Lock, supra note 58, at 409-10.
65. See Oscar Dixon, Judge's Ruling Opens Door for NBA Signings, USA TODAY, July 19,
1994, at 9C.
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Accordingly, the league-wide salary scale would be settled at the bar-
gaining table between parties that must reach an arms-length agreement
in order to avoid meddlesome antitrust suits. The league-wide salary
scale, unlike the salary cap, would be researched, formulated and pro-
posed by the union seeking to enhance wages and other benefits for all
players in the league. So what are you waiting for players unions? Step
up on the scale and do your duty.

